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Abstract—Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon 
the Internet to provide improved network services. However, the 
interaction between overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as 
among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt 
game theoretic approaches to analyze this hybrid interaction. 
Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1-
player non-cooperative game, where overlays and TE are of equal 
status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE). Secondly, 
we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leader-
n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, where TE is the leader and co-
existing overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at 
Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at 
NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism 
based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of 
NE and SNE, where players can improve their performance and 
form stable coalitions. 
Keywords—overlay, traffic engineering, Nash equilibrium, 
Stackelberg game, coalition, Shapley value 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Overlays are logical networks built above the physical 
network, which can improve the network performance without 
modifying the underlay network. Over the past few years, a wide 
variety of overlay networks have been deployed upon the 
Internet by Service Providers (SPs) to provide different kinds of 
services, such as content delivery network (CDN), peer-to-peer 
network (P2P) and resilient overlay network (RON) [1]. 
Although these overlay applications improve the performance of 
traditional IP layer routing, the interaction between each overlay 
and underlay network, as well as the interaction among multiple 
co-existing overlay networks may occur. Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) adopts traffic engineering (TE) to optimize the 
global cost of the network. As the emerging overlays allocate 
traffic in the logical layer according to their own objectives, the 
established TE routing strategy may lead to sub-optimization for 
the underlay network. Thus, TE is triggered to readjust the routes 
and the new physical routes may turn back to affect the 
performance of overlays [2]-[6]. On the other hand, when 
multiple co-existing overlays are deployed upon the same 
physical network, their overlay routes may overlap each other 
since a physical link may belong to several overlay routes at the 
same time. These overlays compete for physical resources to 
optimize their own performance regardless of the impact on 
others, and they can interact with each other by adjusting the 
traffic on the overlapping routes [7]-[11]. For simplicity, we use 
hybrid interaction to represent the interaction between each 
overlay and TE and among co-existing overlays, which is shown 
in Fig. 1. 
This paper studies the hybrid interaction of a scenario where 
multiple co-existing overlays are built upon the physical network 
of ISP. Since ISP provides the physical network for SPs in reality, 
its status should be equal or higher than SPs. Thus, we adopt two 
non-cooperative game models to analyze the hybrid interaction. 
We assume that the overlay’s objective is to minimize its own 
delay cost and TE’s objective is to minimize the congestion cost 
of the underlay physical network. In this paper, we make the 
following main contributions: 
 We model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an 
n+1-player non-cooperative game, where overlays and 
TE have equal status and the hybrid interaction between 
players ends up with a stable state that is Nash 
equilibrium (NE). We prove the existence of NE, which 
can be achieved through dynamic best response. 
 We model another situation of the hybrid interaction as 
a 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, where 
TE is the leader and overlays are followers. In this game, 
TE has higher status than overlays and plays its routing 
strategy first, and then all the overlays react optimally. 
We prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium 
(SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. 
 In order to improve the performance of NE and SNE, 
we adopt a coalition game to explore a cooperative 
approach for co-existing overlays and TE. Our 
cooperative approach considers Pareto efficiency and 
fairness, where the players in the coalition cooperate to 
optimize the performance of the coalition and share 
costs based on Shapley value. 
 Because of the NP-complexity of the problem, we 
apply distinct genetic algorithms (GA) to compute NE, 
SNE and the cost for each player in the coalition game. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Game theory [12] has been extensively used in networking 
research.  A user equilibrium model for the interaction between 
network users as the standard network optimization problem was 
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Fig. 1. Hybrid interaction in overlay environments 
proposed by Roughgarden [13]. Liu et al. [2] studied the 
interaction between one single overlay and TE by using best-
reply dynamics and demonstrated the impact of overlay routing 
on the underlay network. Wang et al. [3] studied the interaction 
between the P2P overlay and TE and pointed out the non-
optimal performance of the network. Jiang et al. [7] studied the 
interaction between multiple co-existing overlays on top of a 
physical network and proved that the interaction may cause the 
efficiency loss and fairness paradox in multiple overlay routing. 
Keralapura et al. [8] studied the interaction among co-existing 
overlays competing for limited network resources. Xiao et al. [6] 
modeled the interaction of overlays and underlay networks in 
multi-domain networks as a congestion game and provided some 
operational guidelines to ensure system stability. 
Researchers have explored some ways to solve the conflicts 
in the interaction. Jiang et al. [7] proposed a pricing scheme to 
improve the performance of overlays. Gong et al. [4] adopted a 
repeated game to reduce the oscillations between overlay and TE. 
Cohen et al. [14] studied the optimization problem of deploying 
overlay nodes. Wang et al. [10] studied the collaborations of 
multiple selfish overlays by using multi-path resources. Yang et 
al. [11] studied the interaction among multiple co-existing P2P 
systems and proposed an ISP-friendly inter-overlay coordination 
framework to control P2P traffic. Cooperative game theory can 
be applied as an alternative way to overcome the inefficiency of 
NE. Jiang et al. [5] and Cui et al. [9] adopted a Nash bargaining 
theory to improve the inefficiency of NE. However, Nash 
bargaining can only be applied to the game with two players. 
When there are more players in the game, the problem becomes 
more complex. Ma et al. [15] applied Shapley value to network 
environments for ISP settlement. Niyato et al. [16] considered a 
mobile cloud computing environment in which cooperative SPs 
can form a coalition to create a resource pool to support the 
mobile applications and share the revenue obtained by the 
resource pool. Misra et al. [17] proposed an ideal incentive 
structure based on Shapley cooperative theory so that each 
content provider can receive a fair price for the usage of its 
resources. 
III. MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In this section we model the co-existing overlays and TE. 
A. Network Model 
Let ܩ ൌ ሺܸǡ ܧሻ represent the underlay network, where ܸ is 
the set of physical nodes and ܧ is the set of links. Then we define 
a capacity vector ܥ ൌ ሺܿ௘భǡ ܿ௘మ ǡڮ ǡ ܿ௘ȁಶȁሻ , where ܿ௘  is the 
capacity for each link ݁ א ܧ, a routing set ܴ, where each route 
ݎ א ܴ denotes a possible route of the underlay network, and a 
ȁܧȁ ൈ ȁܴȁ physical indicator matrix ܣ where ܽ௘௥ ൌ ͳ if route ݎ 
traverses link ݁, and ܽ௘௥ ൌ Ͳ otherwise. 
An overlay ݏ  in the logical level is represented by graph 
ܩሺ௦ሻ ൌ ሺܸሺ௦ሻǡ ܧሺ௦ሻሻ, where ܸሺ௦ሻ is the set of logical nodes and 
ܧሺ௦ሻ  is the set of logical links. Each overlay node maps to a 
physical node, and each overlay link maps to a set of physical 
routes, i.e. ݎ ՜ ݁ሺ௦ሻ. A logical path ݎሺ௦ሻ א ܴሺ௦ሻ contains a set of 
logical links. Each overlay may have several demands, each of 
which is a source-sink pair associated with a flow ݂ with traffic 
volume ݓ௙. Consider there are ݊ overlays on top of an underlay 
and let ܰ  denote the full set of overlays. Let ܨ௦  denote all 
demands of overlay ݏ. Also, we consider background demands 
from underlay users that directly use the underlay network to 
transfer data. Let ܨ௕ represent all background demands. We use 
set ܨ ൌ ׫ ܨ௦௦אே ׫ ܨ௕  to denote all flows. Let ܾሺ௜ǡ௙ሻǡ ݅ א ܰǡ ܾ 
denote a ȁܧሺ௜ሻȁ ൈ ȁ ௙ܴ
ሺ௜ሻȁ logical indicator matrix, where ܾ௘௥
ሺ௜ǡ௙ሻ ൌ
ͳ if flow ݂ traverses overlay link ݁ሺ௜ሻ, and ܾ௘௥
ሺ௜ǡ௙ሻ ൌ Ͳ otherwise. 
Then we rewrite the matrix ܤ  as: ܤ ൌ
ሺܾሺଵሻǡڮ ǡ ܾሺ௡ሻǡ ܾሺ௕ሻሻ்ǡ ܾሺ௜ሻ ൌ ሺܾሺ௜ǡ௙భሻǡ ڮ ǡ ܾሺ௜ǡ௙ȁಷ೔ȁሻሻ݅ א ܰǡ ܾ. 
The overlay determines the routing of all demands for its 
overlay users. For each flow ݂ א ܨ௦, the overlay needs to decide 
how to assign its traffic ݓ௙  to possible routes. Thus, we can 
define an allocation decision vector for flow ݕሺ௦ǡ௙ሻ ൌ
ሺݕ
௥భ
ሺೞሻ
ሺ௦ǡ௙ሻǡ ݕ
௥మ
ሺೞሻ
ሺ௦ǡ௙ሻǡ ڮ ǡ ݕ
ȁோ೑
ሺೞሻȁ
ሺ௦ǡ௙ሻ ሻ், where ݕ
௥ሺೞሻ
ሺ௦ǡ௙ሻ
 is the traffic volume on 
logical path ݎሺ௦ሻ for flow ݂  in overlay ݏ . We have 
σ ݕ
௥ሺೞሻ
ሺ௦ǡ௙ሻ
௥ሺೞሻאோ೑
ሺೞሻ ൌ ݓ௙ . Similarly, ݕሺ௕ǡ௙ሻ  is defined for each 
background flow ݂ א ܨ௕, as no routing policy can be applied for 
those background flows, thus ݕሺ௕ǡ௙ሻ ൌ ݓ௙. We then write: ܻ ൌ
ሺݕሺଵሻǡڮ ǡ ݕሺ௡ሻǡ ݕሺ௕ሻሻǡ ݕሺ௜ሻ ൌ ሺݕሺ௜ǡ௙భሻǡ ڮ ǡ ݕሺ௜ǡ௙ȁಷ೔ȁሻሻ்݅ א ܰǡ ܾ. 
The overlay and background users pass on their demands to 
underlay. And TE decides how to allocate the traffic on physical 
links. The total volume between two neighbor logical nodes in 
fact maps a physical demand, i.e., σ ݁ሺ௜ሻ௜אேǡ௕  corresponds to 
demands from the logical source node of ݁ሺ௜ሻ to the sink node. 
Denote ܺ as a ȁܴȁ ൈ σ ȁܧሺ௜ሻȁ௜אேǡ௕  matrix and its element ݔ௥௘ሺ೔ሻ is 
the fraction of volume from logical links that TE allocates to 
route ݎ, and we have σ ݔ௥௘ሺ೔ሻ௥אோ೐ሺ೔ሻ ൌ ͳ for each flow logical 
link. Here TE does not differentiate demands between overlay 
and underlay users and performs the same fractions for demands 
with the same source-sink. Then the volume on each link ݁: ܮ ൌ
ሺ݈௘భǡ ݈௘మ ǡڮ ݈௘ȁಶȁሻ
்  is: 
ܮ ൌ ܣܺ ෍ ෍ܾሺ௜ǡ௙ሻݕሺ௜ǡ௙ሻ
௙אி௜אேǡ௕
ൌ ܣܺ ෍ ܾሺ௜ሻ
௜אேǡ௕
ݕሺ௜ሻ
ൌ ܣܺܤܻǡ 
(1) 
where ݈௘ is the volume of demands allocated to physical link ݁. 
We say allocation decisions ܺǡ ܻ  of overlay and TE are 
feasible if they satisfy the conditions that ܻ ൒ Ͳǡ ܺ ൒ Ͳǡ ܮ் ൑ ܥ. 
i.e., the volume on logical links and fraction on physical links 
are non-negative and the aggregate volume allocated to link ݁ is 
no more than its capacity ܿ௘. 366
B. Objective of TE 
The objective of TE is to minimize the congestion cost in the 
whole physical network. Denote ݋௘ሺ݈௘ሻ  as the congestion 
function for physical link ݁ א ܧ, and the congestion function is 
continuous, increasing and convex. For all physical links, we 
define ܱሺܮሻ ൌ ሺ݋௘భሺ݈௘భሻǡ ݋௘మሺ݈௘మሻǡڮ ǡ ݋௘ȁಶȁሺ݈௘ȁಶȁሻሻ
்ǡ ݁ א ܧ  as 
the congestion function. Let ݂ሺܺሻ denote the congestion cost of 
the whole physical network. Therefore: 
݂ሺܺሻ ൌ෍݋௘ሺ݈௘ሻ
௘אா
Ǥ (2) 
The optimization problem for TE can be rewritten as: 
 ݂ሺܺሻ ൌ ߜܱሺܮሻ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ቐ
׊݁ሺ௦ሻ א ܧሺ௦ሻǡ෍ ݔ௥௘ሺೞሻ
௥אோ೐ሺೞሻ
ൌ ͳ
ܻ ൒ Ͳǡ ܺ ൒ Ͳǡ ܮ் ൑ ܥ
ǡ (3) 
where ߜ ൌ ሺͳǡͳǡڮ ǡͳሻ,ȁߜȁ ൌ ȁܧȁ. 
C. Objective of Overlays 
The objective of overlay routing is to minimize the delay in 
its overlay network. Here, we adopt an additive link delay cost, 
where the path delay is the summation of delay costs of all links 
along this path and the flow delay is the weighted summation of 
path delay used by this flow. Denote ݀௘ሺ݈௘ሻ as the unit delay 
function of physical link ݁ א ܧ  and the delay function is 
continuous, increasing and convex. For all physical links ݁ א ܧ, 
we define the unit delay function ܦሺܮሻ ൌ
ሺ݀௘భሺ݈௘భሻǡ ݀௘మሺ݈௘మሻǡڮ ǡ ݀௘ȁಶȁሺ݈௘ȁಶȁሻሻ
் . Let ݃ሺ௦ሻሺݕሺ௦ሻሻ denote the 
delay for overlay ݏ. By using the notations above, the delay for 
overlay ݏ is: 
݃ሺ௦ሻ൫ݕሺ௦ሻ൯ ൌ ෍ ݈௘ሺೞሻ ෍ ݔ௥௘ሺೞሻ݀௘ሺ݈௘ሻ
௘א௥ǡ௥՜௘ሺೞሻ
ǡ
௘ሺೞሻאாሺೞሻ
 (4) 
where ݈௘ሺೞሻ  represents the volume on logical link ݁
ሺ௦ሻ א ܧሺ௦ሻ. 
Here we expand the size of ܾሺ௦ሻ  and ݕሺ௦ሻ  to ܤ  and ܻ , 
respectively, by filling the vacant elements with zero. The 
optimization problem for overlay ݏ can be rewritten as: 
 ݃ሺ௦ሻ൫ݕሺ௦ሻ൯ ൌ ൫ܣܾܺሺ௦ሻݕሺ௦ሻ൯
்
ܦሺܮሻ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ቐ
׊݂ א ܨ௦ǡ෍ ݕ௥ሺೞሻ
ሺ௦ǡ௙ሻ
௥ሺೞሻאோ೑
ሺೞሻ
ൌ ݓ௙
ܻ ൒ Ͳǡ ܺ ൒ Ͳǡ ܮ் ൑ ܥ

ǡ (5) 
where ݕሺି௦ሻ is the allocation from other overlays. 
IV. N+1-PLAYER NON-COOPERATIVE GAME 
In this section, we consider a situation of the hybrid 
interaction where co-existing overlays and TE have equal status 
and model it as an n+1-player non-cooperative game. 
A. Non-cooperative Game 
We define a set of players ܰ ൅ ͳ ൌ ሼͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ ݊ ൅ ͳሽ, where 
first ݊ players are overlays and the last is TE. The set of overlay 
s is a volume allocation matrix of demands and the set of TE is 
a fraction allocation matrix of flows. The set is: 
߁௜ ൌ
ە
ۖ
ۖ
ۖ
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۖ
ۖ
ۖ
ۓ
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ
ݕሺ௜ሻ
ተ
ተ
ݕሺ௜ሻ א Թା
หோሺ೔ሻหൈ෍ ቚோ೑
ሺ೔ሻቚ
೑אಷ೔ ǡ
ܻ ൒ Ͳǡ ܮ் ൑ ܥǡ ׊݂ א ܨ௜ǡ
෍ ݕ
௥ሺ೔ሻ
ሺ௜ǡ௙ሻ
௥ሺ೔ሻאோ೑
ሺ೔ሻ
ൌ ݓ௙
ۙ
ۖ
ۘ
ۖ
ۗ
ǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡڮ ǡ ݊
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ
ܺተ
ተ
ܺ א Թା
ȁோȁൈ෍ หாሺೕሻห
ೕאಿǡ್ ǡ
ܺ ൒ Ͳǡ ܮ் ൑ ܥǡ ׊݁ሺ௦ሻ א ܧሺ௦ሻǡ
෌ ݔ௥௘ሺೞሻ௥אோ೐ሺೞሻ
ൌ ͳ
ۙ
ۖ
ۘ
ۖ
ۗ
ǡ ݅ ൌ ݊ ൅ ͳ
ǡ (6) 
where Թା  is the non-negative set. Furthermore, let ௦ܷ 
denote the payoff function of overlay ݏ with ௜ܷ ൌ
െ݃ሺ௜ሻ൫ݕሺ௜ሻ൯ǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ ݊. Let ܷ௡ାଵ denote the payoff function 
of TE with ܷ௡ାଵ ൌ െ݂ሺܺሻ. Finally, we define the n+1-player 
non-cooperative game ܩۃܰ ൅ ͳǡ ߁ǡ ܷۄ , where ߁ ൌ ߁ଵ ൈǤ Ǥ Ǥൈ
߁௡ ൈ ߁௡ାଵ denotes the set of strategy profiles and ܷ ൌ ଵܷ ൈǤ Ǥ Ǥൈ
ܷ௡ ൈ ܷ௡ାଵ  denotes the set of corresponding utility profiles. 
Then we have the following definition of NE, which describes a 
situation where no player can improve its own objective by 
altering its routing strategy unilaterally. 
Definition 1. A feasible strategy profile ሺܻכǡ ܺכሻ א ߁ , 
ሺܻכǡ ܺכሻ ൌ ሺݕכሺଵሻǡ ݕכሺଶሻǡڮ ǡ ݕכሺ௡ሻǡ ܺכሻ is NE if for each overlay 
݅ א ܰ and TE: 
׊ݕᇱሺ௜ሻ א ߁௜ǡ
௜ܷ
כ ൌ െ݃ሺ௜ሻሺݕכሺ௜ሻǡ ݕכሺି௜ሻǡ ܺכሻ ൒ െ݃ሺ௜ሻሺݕᇱሺ௜ሻǡ ݕכሺି௜ሻǡ ܺכሻ
׊ܺᇱ א ߁௡ାଵǡ
ܷ௡ାଵכ ൌ െ݂ሺܻכǡ ܺכሻ ൒ െ݂ሺܻכǡ ܺᇱሻ
Ǥ (7) 
Theorem 1. In ܩۃܰ ൅ ͳǡ ߁ǡ ܷۄ , NE exists if ݃ሺ௦ሻ  and ݂ 
functions are continuous, increasing and convex. 
Proof: If NE exists, the game should meet two conditions [18]: 
(1) Each player’s strategy space ߁௜  is a nonempty compact 
convex subset of a Euclidean space. (2) The preference relation 
between ܷ is quasi-concave and continuous on ߁௜ . Firstly, the 
strategy spaces in ܩۃܰ ൅ ͳǡ ߁ǡ ܷۄ  are well defined by the 
capacity of links and the non-negativity constraint ܻ ൒ Ͳǡ ܺ ൒
Ͳǡ ܮ் ൑ ܥ with a closed and bounded feasible region, thus ߁௜  is 
compact. Moreover, all constraints are affine functions and the 
feasible domain is the intersection of half-spaces and 
hyperplanes, thus ߁௜  is convex. Hence, ܩۃܰ ൅ ͳǡ ߁ǡ ܷۄ meets the 
first condition. Secondly, ݃ሺ௦ሻ and ݂ are continuous and convex, 
hence, the payoff functions ௦ܷ  and ܷ௡ାଵ  are continuous and 
quasi-concave on ߁௜  and so is preference relation between ܷ . 
Therefore, ܩۃܰ ൅ ͳǡ ߁ǡ ܷۄ meets the second condition. ■ 
In order to compute the NE allocation for overlays and TE, 
we first define the notation of best response. And NE is the status 
where each player adopts its best response. 
Definition 2. In a game ܩۃܰ ൅ ͳǡ ߁ǡ ܷۄ , each player’s best 
response to the strategies of other players is the strategy that 
minimizes its objective function, which is: 
ݕሺ௜ሻሺݕሺି௜ሻǡ ܺሻ ൌ ݃ሺ௜ሻሺݕሺ௜ሻǡ ݕሺି௜ሻǡ ܺሻǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡڮ ݊
ܺሺܻሻ ൌ  ݂ሺܺǡ ܻሻǡ ݅ ൌ ݊ ൅ ͳ
Ǥ (8) 367
B. Genetic Algorithm 
Since solving optimal allocations for TE and overlays is NP-
hard, we apply genetic algorithm (GA) [19] to obtain the 
solution, which is algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1: Computing Optimal Allocation 
Input: 
݉: the number of chromosomes; 
ߪ: the tolerable error; 
ߙǡܯ଴: parameter ߙǡܯ଴ א ሺͲǡͳሻ; 
݌௖ǡ ݌௠: the probability of crossover, mutation; 
Output: 
ܺ௕௘௦௧: the best chromosome found; 
 
1. ௕݂௘௦௧ ՚ λ; ଵ݂ ՚ Ͳ; 
//Initialization: initialize some chromosomes 
2. Initialize ݉ feasible chromosomes ଵܺǡ ܺଶǡڮ ǡ ܺ௠; 
3. while ȁ ଵ݂ െ ௕݂௘௦௧ȁ ൏ ߪ do 
4.  ܯ ՚ ܯ଴Ǣ ௜݂ ՚ ݂ሺ ௜ܺሻǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ݉; 
5.  Order ଵܺǡ ܺଶǡڮ ǡ ܺ௠ by ascending ଵ݂ǡ ଶ݂ǡ ڮ ǡ ௠݂; 
6.  if ଵ݂ ൏ ௕݂௘௦௧ then ܺ௕௘௦௧ ՚ ଵܺǢ ௕݂௘௦௧ ՚ ଵ݂; 
//Evaluation: evaluate the fitness of each chromosome 
7.  ݂݅ݐ݊݁ݏݏ௜ ՚ ߙሺͳ െ ߙሻ௜ିଵǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ݉; 
//Selection: select chromosomes by the roulette wheel 
8.  ߩ௜ ՚ ෌ ݂݅ݐ݊݁ݏݏ௝
௜
௝ୀଵ ǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ݉; 
9.  for ݅ ൌ ͳǣ ͳǣ݉ do 
10.       if randomሺͲǡ ߩ௠ሻ א ሺߩ௝ିଵǡ ߩ௝ሻ then ௜ܺ ՚ ௝ܺ; 
//Crossover: Update chromosomes by crossover operation 
11.  ߉௖ ՚ ׎Ǣ ݆ ՚ ͳ; 
12.  for ݅ ൌ ͳǣ ͳǣ݉ do 
13.       if random(Ͳǡͳ) ൏ ݌௖ then 
14.            ܺᇱ௜ ՚ ௜ܺǢ ߉௖ሺ݆ሻ ՚ ௜ܺᇱǢ ݆ ൅ ൅; 
15.  for ݇ ൌ ͳǣ ʹǣlengthሺ߉௖ሻ do 
16.       ௜ܺᇱ ՚ ߉௖ሺ݇ሻǢ ௝ܺᇱ ՚ ߉௖ሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻ; 
17.       do 
18.            ߚ ՚ random(Ͳǡͳሻ; 
19.            ௜ܺ ՚ ߚ ڄ ௜ܺᇱ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߚሻ ڄ ௝ܺᇱ; 
20.            ௝ܺ ՚ ሺͳ െ ߚሻ ڄ ௜ܺᇱ ൅ ߚ ڄ ௝ܺᇱ; 
21.       until ௜ܺ א ߁௡ାଵƬ ௜ܺ א ߁௡ାଵ 
//Mutation˖Update chromosomes by mutation operation 
22.  ߉௠ ՚ ׎Ǣ ݆ ՚ ͳ; 
23.  for ݅ ൌ ͳǣ ͳǣ݉ do 
24.       if random(Ͳǡͳ) ൏ ݌௠ then 
25.            ௜ܺᇱ ՚ ௜ܺǢ ߉௠ሺ݆ሻ ՚ ௜ܺᇱǢ ݆ ൅ ൅; 
26.  for ݇ ൌ ͳǣ ͳǣlengthሺ߉௠ሻ do 
27.       ௜ܺᇱ ՚ ߉௠ሺ݇ሻ; ݀௜௝ ՚ randomሺെͳǡͳሻǢ ݀ ՚ ݀௜௝  
      //݅ ൌ ͳǡڮ ǡ ȁܴȁǡ ݆ ൌ ͳǡڮ ǡ෌ ȁܧሺ௜ሻȁ௜אேǡ௕  
28.       do 
29.            ௜ܺ ՚ ௜ܺᇱ ൅ ܯ ڄ ݀; 
30.            if ௜ܺ ב ߁௡ାଵ then ܯ ՚ randomሺͲǡܯሻ; 
31.       until ௜ܺ א ߁௡ାଵ 
32. return ܺ௕௘௦௧  
Similarly, we can use algorithm 1 to compute the dynamic 
best response for each overlay ݏ by replacing ௜ܺ ǡ ܺ௕௘௦௧ǡ ௜݂ ǡ ௕݂௘௦௧  
with ݕ௜
ሺ௦ሻǡ ݕ௕௘௦௧
ሺ௦ሻ ǡ ݃௜
ሺ௦ሻǡ ݃௕௘௦௧
ሺ௦ሻ
. 
C. Dynamic Best Response 
In general, players do not possess perfect information of 
other players at the beginning of the game, and they can only 
play their strategies based on the existent situation. Nevertheless, 
since players repeatedly interact with each other, they will 
gradually obtain the information and finally have the perfect 
information, which leads to the convergence of NE. In order to 
compute NE, we first give TE and overlay networks an initial 
allocation, which is an arbitrary feasible allocation of ܺǡ ܻ . 
Then, TE and overlays take turns to use algorithm 1 to compute 
their dynamic best responses until they reach NE, whchi is 
algorithm 2. 
Algorithm 2: Computing NE 
Input: 
ሺܺǡ ܻሻ௕௘௦௧ሺͲሻ: initial allocations; 
Output: 
ሺܺǡ ܻሻோ: the results for NE; 
 
1. ݐ ՚ ͳ; 
2. do 
3.  TE use algorithm 1 to compute ܺ௕௘௦௧ሺݐሻ; 
4.  Overlay 1 use algorithm 1 to compute ݕ௕௘௦௧
ሺଵሻ ሺݐሻ; 
5.  ڮڮ 
6.  Overlay ݊ use algorithm 1 to compute ݕ௕௘௦௧
ሺ௡ሻ ሺݐሻ; 
7.  ݐ ൅ ൅; 
8. until ሺܺǡ ܻሻ௕௘௦௧ሺݐሻ ൌ ሺܺǡ ܻሻ௕௘௦௧ሺݐ െ ͳሻ 
9. return ሺܺǡ ܻሻோ ՚ ሺܺǡ ܻሻ௕௘௦௧ሺݐሻ 
V. 1-LEADER-N-FOLLOWER STACKELBERG-NASH GAME 
In this section, we consider a situation where TE has higher 
status than all overlays. We model this interaction as a 1-leader-
n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game [19], where TE is the leader 
with complete knowledge of strategies of all the following 
overlays. 
A. Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium 
For each routing strategy ܺ א ߁௡ାଵ of TE as the leader, let 
ܻሺܺሻ denote the reaction set of overlays dependent on ܺ such 
that ܻሺܺሻ ൌ ሼܻȁܻ א ߁ଵ ൈ ߁ଶ ൈ ڮൈ ߁௡ሽ . Assume that TE first 
chooses its routing strategy ܺ א ߁௡ାଵ as the leader, and then all 
overlays determine their strategies ሺݕሺଵሻǡ ݕሺଶሻǡڮ ǡ ݕሺ௡ሻሻ א ܻሺܺሻ 
The problem of the 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game 
can be described as: 
 ݂ሺܺǡ ܻሺܺሻሻ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ܺ א ߁௡ାଵ
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ݕሺଵሻǡ ݕሺଶሻǡڮ ǡ ݕሺ௡ሻݏ݋݈ݒ݁ݏǣ
 ݃ሺ௦ሻ൫ݕሺ௦ሻǡ ݕሺି௦ሻǡ ܺ൯
ݏǤ ݐǤ ݕሺ௦ሻ א ߁௦
Ǥ (9) 
This optimization problem is classified as bi-level 
programming (BP) problem [20]. In this Stackelberg-Nash 
game, all overlays are of equal status. For all overlays, the best 
solution is the NE among them, which is defined by ܻכሺܺሻ ൌ
ሺݕכሺଵሻǡ ݕכሺଶሻǡڮ ǡ ݕכሺ௡ሻሻ א ܻሺܺሻ with respect to ܺ. Then, we have 
the following definition of SNE for the 1-leader-n-follower 
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Definition 3. A feasible strategy profile ሺܻ*ሺܺ*ሻǡ ܺכሻ א ߁ , 
ሺܻ*ሺܺ*ሻǡ ܺכሻ ൌ ሺݕכሺଵሻǡ ݕכሺଶሻǡ ڮ ǡ ݕכሺ௡ሻǡ ܺכሻ is SNE if and only if: 
׊ܺᇱ א ߁௡ାଵǡ ܻ*ሺܺᇱሻ ൌ ሺݕᇱ
ሺଵሻǡ ݕᇱሺଶሻǡ ڮ ǡ ݕᇱሺ௡ሻሻ
ܷ௡ାଵכ ൌ െ݂ሺܺכǡ ܻכሺܺכሻሻ ൒ െ݂ሺܺᇱǡ ܻכሺܺᇱሻሻ
Ǥ (10) 
According to this definition, SNE prescribes an optimal 
strategy for TE, if TE plays first and then all overlays react 
optimally. We can easily prove that the cost at SNE is at least as 
good as that at NE for TE. 
Theorem 2. In ܩۃܰ ൅ ͳǡ ߁ǡ ܷۄ, the cost at SNE is at least as 
good as that at NE for TE. 
Proof: Let ሺ തܻǡ തܺሻ be the NE and ሺܻ*ሺܺ*ሻǡ ܺכሻ be the SNE. If TE 
first choose തܺ as the leader, ܻ*ሺ തܺሻ ൌ തܻ holds for all overlays as 
followers. Thus, we have ഥܷ௡ାଵ ൌ െ݂ሺ തܺǡ തܻሻ ൌ െ݂ሺ തܺǡ ܻ*ሺ തܺሻሻ . 
By the definition of SNE, we have ഥܷ௡ାଵ ൌ െ݂ሺ തܺǡ ܻ*ሺ തܺሻሻ ൑
ܷ௡ାଵכ ൌ െ݂ሺܺכǡ ܻ*ሺܺכሻሻ. ■ 
B. Algorithm for Solving Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium 
For the BP problem described in (9), we also use GA to 
search the optimal strategy for TE. The following algorithm 3 is 
proposed to compute SNE: 
Algorithm 3: Computing SNE 
Input:  
݉ǡ ߪǡ ߙǡܯ଴ǡ ݌௖ǡ ݌௠: same as algorithm 1; 
Output: 
ሺܺǡ ܻሻௌோ: the results for SNE; 
 
1. ௕݂௘௦௧ ՚ λ; ଵ݂ ՚ Ͳ; 
2. Initialization: same as algorithm 1 step 2; 
3. while ȁ ଵ݂ െ ௕݂௘௦௧ȁ ൏ ߪ do 
4.  for ݅ ൌ ͳǣ ͳǣ݉ do 
5.       Compute NE among all overlays by algorithm 2 
      except step 4; ܻ*ሺ ௜ܺሻ ՚ NE; 
6.  ܯ ՚ ܯ଴Ǣ ௜݂ ՚ ݂ሺ ௜ܺǡ ܻ*ሺ ௜ܺሻሻǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ݉; 
7.  Evaluation, Selection, Crossover and Mutation: 
same as algorithm 1 step 7-31; 
8. return ሺܺǡ ܻሻௌோ ՚ ሺܺ௕௘௦௧ǡ ܻ*ሺܺ௕௘௦௧ሻሻ 
VI. COALITION GAME 
It has been pointed out that NE and SNE in the non-
cooperative game are usually inefficient [13]. In order to 
improve the performance of overlays and TE at NE and SNE, 
we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism by applying the 
concepts of core and Shapley value to determine the share of cost 
taken by each player. 
A. Coalition Game 
A coalition game [12] is denoted by ۃԧǡ ݒۄ, where ԧ ك ܰ ൅
ͳ is the coalition representing the set of cooperative players in 
the same group and ݒሺڄሻ is the coalitional function for coalition 
ԧ . ԧ ൌ ܰ ൅ ͳ  is called the grand coalition. There could be 
multiple coalitions and the set of all coalitions is referred to as 
coalitional structure Ȱ ൌ ሼԧଵǡ ԧଶǡڮ ǡ ԧȁ஍ȁሽ  such that ܰ ൅ ͳ ൌ
׫ ԧ௜
ȁ஍ȁ
௜ୀଵ , ԧ௜ ת ԧ௝ ൌ ׎ and ԧ௜ ك Ȱ. The objective value ݒሺԧሻ for 
the coalition ԧ is defined by the unified cost of all players in the 
coalition, and players in the same coalition will cooperate to 
minimize the objective cost of the whole coalition. Thus, ݒሺԧሻ 
is defined by: 
ݒሺԧሻ ൌ ෍߬௜
௜אԧ
 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁߬௜ ൌ ൜
݃ሺ௜ሻሺݕሺ௜ሻǡ ݕሺି௜ሻሻǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ ݊
ߙ݂ሺܺሻǡ ݅ ൌ ݊ ൅ ͳ
, 
(11) 
where ߙ is the equivalent weight between congestion and delay, 
i.e., when sharing cost, 1 unit congestion equals to ߙ units delay. 
The value of ߙ is depended on the negotiation results of TE and 
overlays or other external factors. Thus, the interaction between 
coalitions is a non-cooperative game and will end up with NE 
after several iterations. Likewise, we use algorithm 2 to compute 
NE for the interaction between coalitions regarding each 
coalition as a player in the game. 
1) Core Solution 
We first define the core among cooperative players in 
coalition ԧ, which is: 
ܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌ ൛ݖห׊ܵ ك ԧǡ෌ ݖ௜ ൌ ݒሺԧሻǡ௜אԧ ෌ ݖ௜ ൑ ݒሺܵሻ௜אௌ ൟǡ (12) 
where ݖ ൌ ሺݖ௜ǡ ݅ א ܵሻ, and ݖ௜ is the assigned cost for player ݅ in 
coalition ԧ. The core is a set of cost shares which guarantee that 
no player will leave the coalition ԧ and form subcoalition ܵ ك
ԧ. Namely, the summation of assigned costs by coalition ԧ is 
always less than or equal to that of assigned costs by any 
subcoalition ܵ  (i.e., ෌ ݖ௜ ൑ ݒሺܵሻ௜אௌ ). Thus, the core solution 
stabilizes the coalition. 
2) Shapley Value 
We now apply the concept of Shapley value to assign fair 
cost shares to each player in coalition ԧ. The Shapley value for 
player ݅ in coalition ԧ can be obtained as follows: 
߮௜ሺݒሻ ൌ ෍
ȁܵȁǨ ሺȁԧȁ െ ȁܵȁ െ ͳሻǨ
ȁԧȁǨ
ሾݒሺܵ ׫ ݅ሻ െ ݒሺܵሻሿ
ௌكԧ̳ሼ௜ሽ
 (13) 
The Shapley value ߮௜ሺݒሻ  is obtained by evaluating the 
contribution of each player ݅ in reducing the cost of the coalition, 
which determines the cost to be shared by player ݅. The Shapley 
value is suitable for cost share of the cooperative players in 
coalition ԧ because of the following properties. 
Efficiency: Since ෌ ߮௜ሺݒሻ ൌ ݒሺԧሻ௜אԧ , the summation of costs 
of all cooperative players is minimized. 
Symmetry: For two arbitrary player ݅ǡ ݆ א ԧ, if ݒሺܵ ׫ ݅ሻ ൌ ݒሺܵ ׫
݆ሻ holds for all the subcoalition ܵ ك ԧ without these two players, 
then ߮௜ሺݒሻ ൌ ߮௝ሺݒሻ . That is, when players ݅  and ݆  have the 
same contribution to the coalition, the cost shares of the players 
݅ and ݆ will be equal. 
Dummy: For a player ݅ , if ݒሺܵሻ ൌ ݒሺܵ ׫ ݅ሻ  holds for all the 
subcoalition ܵ ك ԧ without player ݅, then ߮௜ሺݒሻ ൌ Ͳ. That is, if 
player ݅ does not contribute to the total cost of the coalition (e.g., 
overlay ݅ has no traffic in the network), then cost share of this 
player will be zero. 
Additivity: If ݒ and ݒᇱ are the coalitional functions, then ߮ሺݒ ൅
ݒᇱሻ ൌ ߮ሺݒᇱ ൅ ݒሻ ൌ ߮ሺݒሻ ൅ ߮ሺݒᇱሻ. 369
For the Shapley value, the individual efficiency and fairness 
can be achieved. Specifically, the cost shared by the cooperative 
player is less than or equal to the cost of the player having no 
cooperation with other players (߮௜ሺݒሻ ൑ ݒሺ݅ሻ). Moreover, the 
Shapley value is unique. 
B. Coalition Formation 
We assume that all players are rational and self-interested to 
minimize their own costs by forming a coalition. The coalition 
formation process can be described as a non-cooperative game. 
The set of players consisting of all overlays and TE is ܰ ൅ ͳ. In 
the game, each player has to decide whether to form coalition 
with other players. The cooperation between player ݅ and player 
݆ can be denoted by a binary variable ݍ௜௝ , where ݍ௜௝ ൌ ͳ if they 
cooperate and ݍ௜௝ ൌ Ͳ  otherwise. The strategy of player ݅  is 
ݍ௜ ൌ ሺݍ௜ଵǡ ݍ௜ଶǡڮ ǡ ݍ௜ǡ௡ାଵሻ. Thus we rewrite the strategies of all 
players ܳ  as ܳ ൌ ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡڮ ǡ ݍ௡ାଵሻ , ݍ௜௝ ൌ ݍ௝௜ǡ ݅ǡ ݆ ൌ
ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ ݊ ൅ ͳ. The feasible set of strategies of each player is 
described as follows: 
ȳ௜
ൌ ቐݍ௜ቮ
ݍ௜௝ א ሼͲǡͳሽǡ ݆ א ܰ ൅ ͳ
ݍ௜௝ ൌ ൜
ͳǡ if ݅ǡ ݆ א ԧǡ ׊ԧ
Ͳǡ if ݅ ב ԧ or ݆ ב ԧǡ ׊ԧ
ǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡڮ ǡ ݊ ൅ ͳቑǤ (14) 
The NE ܳכ ൌ ሺݍଵכǡ ݍଶכǡڮ ǡ ݍ௡ାଵכ ሻ for the coalition formation 
game can be defined as follows: 
׊݅ א ܰ ൅ ͳǡ ݍ௜ᇱ א ȳ௜ǡ ߮௜ሺݍ௜כǡ ݍି௜כ ሻ ൑ ߮௜ሺݍ௜ᇱǡ ݍି௜כ ሻ. (15) 
The NE of the coalition formation among players can be 
obtained from the algorithm based on the dynamic best response. 
The player will make a decision on cooperation formation 
iteratively. In each iteration, the player evaluates the new 
strategy, and then switches to the new strategy achieving the 
least cost. The algorithm to compute NE for coalition formation 
game is demonstrated as follows: 
Algorithm 4˖ Computing NE for Coalition Formation 
Input: 
ܳሺͲሻ: initial coalition status; 
Output: 
ܳோ : the coalition results for NE; 
 
1. ݐ ՚ ͳ; 
2. do 
3.  Overlay 1 switches ݍଵሺݐሻ to achieve the least cost; 
4.  Overlay 2 switches ݍଶሺݐሻ to achieve the least cost; 
5.  ڮڮ 
6.  TE switches ݍ௡ାଵሺݐሻ to achieve the least cost; 
7.  ݐ ൅ ൅; 
8. until ܳሺݐሻ=ܳሺݐ െ ͳሻ 
9. return ܳோ ՚ ܳሺݐሻ 
VII. SIMULATION AND EVALUATION RESULTS 
In this section, we conduct simulations to evaluate the 
difference of performances of two situations of the hybrid 
interaction, and then compare them with the performance in 
coalition game. 
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Fig. 2. Simulation networks 
A. Simulation Setup 
We use a 50-node underlay network with three co-existing 
overlays deployed above sharing some common physical links 
and nodes, which is shown in Fig. 2. The underlay network 
consists of one central region and three marginal regions. For 
each overlay, there is one flow pair with demand ݓ௙ ൌ ͳ . 
Besides, there is one unit background demand between every 
neighbor overlay nodes. In order to simulate the situation such 
that overlays compete for the limited common link bandwidth, 
we set the capacity of central links as ܿ௘ ൌ ͵ and the capacity of 
marginal links as ܿ௘ ൌ ͹, respectively. 
The delay function ݀௘ሺ݈௘ሻ  and congestion function ݋௘ሺ݈௘ሻ 
for a physical link are chosen as follows. First, the link delay 
݀௘ሺ݈௘ሻ  generally consists of queuing delay and propagation 
delay such that ݀௘ሺ݈௘ሻ ൌ ͳ ሺܿ௘ െ ݈௘ሻΤ ൅ ݌, where the queuing 
delay is approximated by the M/M/1 model ͳ ሺܿ௘ െ ݈௘ሻΤ  and the 
propagation delay is equal to a constant value ݌. We set the value 
݌ as one in our simulation. Second, the link congestion ݋௘ሺ݈௘ሻ is 
modeled as a piecewise linear, increasing and convex function, 
which is described as follows [5]: 
݋௘ሺ݈௘ሻ
ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ
݈௘ǡͲ ൑ ݈௘ ܿ௘Τ ൏ ͳ ͵Τ
͵݈௘ െ ʹ ͵Τ ܿ௘ ǡͳ ͵Τ   ൑ ݈௘ ܿ௘Τ ൏ ʹ ͵Τ
ͳͲ݈௘ െ ͳ͸ ͵ܿ௘Τ ǡʹ ͵Τ   ൑ ݈௘ ܿ௘Τ ൏ ͻ ͳͲΤ
͹Ͳ݈௘ െ ͳ͹ͺ ͵ܿ௘Τ ǡͻ ͳͲΤ   ൑ ݈௘ ܿ௘Τ ൏ ͳ
ͷͲͲ݈௘ െ ͳͶ͸ͺ ͵ܿ௘Τ ǡͳ  ൑ ݈௘ ܿ௘Τ ൏ ͳͳ ͳͲΤ
ͷͲͲͲ݈௘ െ ͳ͸͵ͳͺ ͵ܿ௘Τ ǡ ͳͳ ͳͲΤ   ൑ ݈௘ ܿ௘Τ ൏ λ
Ǥ 
(16) 
The input parameters we set in algorithm 1 are: ݉ ൌ ͷͲ, 
ߪ=ͲǤͲͲͳ , ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ , and ܯ଴ ൌ ͲǤͳ . Furthermore, we set the 
probability of crossover as ݌௖ ൌ ͲǤͺ  and the probability of 
mutation as ݌௠ ൌ ͲǤͷ. 
B. Simulation Results 
Our simulation results demonstrate the efficiency loss caused 
by the hybrid interaction in the network, as well as the variation 
of routing decisions during the interaction process. 
1) Nash Equilibrium 
In this simulation, the sequence of interactions executed is 
TE-overlay1-overlay2-overlay3. In the beginning, there are only 
background demands in the underlay network for TE and then 
overlay 1, 2, 3 start to transfer their data in turn. In each iteration, 
each player applies algorithm 1 to optimize its strategy. In order 370
to reduce the iteration time of the algorithm, we set some initial 
chromosomes such that TE adopts the shortest route, and set 
others as arbitrary feasible allocation. 
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. We 
observe sudden increases of congestion and delay at the 
beginning because the traffic demands increase when overlay 1, 
2, 3 start to transfer their data. Then we observe some 
oscillations in the middle of the process caused by the conflicts 
between overlays and TE. Eventually, the oscillations subside 
and come to a stable state, which is the NE and the results of NE 
are: ݂ ൌ ͳʹ͸ǤʹͲͷͶ, ݃ሺଵሻ ൌ ͳͳǤ͸Ͳͺͻ , ݃ሺଶሻ ൌ ͳͳǤʹͶͶʹ, ݃ሺଷሻ ൌ
ͳͳǤʹͻͺ͵. The simulation results demonstrate how dynamic best 
responses converge to the NE. However, in general, the results 
may vary due to the multiplicity of NE. Nevertheless, the 
convergence is inevitable after certain iterations, which leads to 
a stable NE. 
2) Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium  
In this simulation, we use the results of NE from the previous 
simulation as initial chromosomes to search SNE for TE. We 
choose the value of least congestion cost equal to that at SNE for 
TE. In this simulation, we obtain a SNE: ݂ ൌ 126.1532, ݃ሺଵሻ ൌ
11.8404 , ݃ሺଶሻ ൌ 11.2394 , ݃ሺଷሻ ൌ 11.0585 . The simulation 
results demonstrate that TE can obtain less congestion cost at 
SNE than at NE. Fig. 5 shows the interaction process of overlays 
when TE first plays the strategy at SNE. We observe that the 
interaction among overlays converge to a stable state after 
several iterations. 
3) Stable Coalition Solution 
In this simulation, we evaluate the coalition formation of 
three overlays (denoted by OR1, OR2 and OR3) and TE with 
ߙ ൌ ͳ. Table 1 shows the Shapley value obtained by each player 
with different coalition formations. There are totally 15 coalition 
structures. We can apply algorithm 4 to reach the stable 
coalition. We observe that the stable coalition structure is Ȱଵଶ* , 
where TE, overlay 1 and overlay 3 cooperate, and overlay 2 is 
separate. Ȱଵଶ*  is stable since all players have no better choice 
than staying in their current coalitions. Note that Ȱଵ  is the 
situation of n+1-player non-cooperative game. Ȱଵହ  is the 
situation of global optimal routing, which achieves the least total 
cost of all players. However, if TE is concerned about its own 
cost, it will leave Ȱଵହ and go to Ȱଵସ. And then, overlays take 
turns to reconsider their strategies. The convergence path of 
coalition formation is Ȱଵହ ՜ Ȱଵସ ՜ Ȱଵ଴ ՜ Ȱଵଵ ՜ Ȱଵଶ* . 
4) Performance Comparison 
We compare the cost of TE and overlays, which is 
demonstrated in Fig. 6. We observe that TE and all overlays can 
improve their performance through cooperation. Moreover, the 
volume of cost they reduce is assigned fairly by Shapley value. 
Thus, the simulation results provide an effective cooperative 
solution for both ISP and SPs. 
 
Fig. 3. Congestion cost for TE in the iteration process 
 
Fig. 4. Delay for three overlays in the iteration process 
TABLE I.  COST ALLOCATION BASED ON THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
Coalition structure The Shapley Value TE OR1 OR2 OR3 
Ȱଵ ൌ ሼሼTEሽǡ ሼOR1ሽǡ ሼOR2ሽǡ ሼOR3ሽሽ 126.2054 11.6089 11.2442 11.2983 
Ȱଶ ൌ ሼሼTE,OR1ሽǡ ሼOR2ሽǡ ሼOR3ሽሽ 125.2191 10.6226 11.1827 11.1705 
Ȱଷ ൌ ሼሼTE,OR1ሽǡ ሼOR2,OR3ሽሽ 124.6511 10.9444 11.2185 11.2062 
Ȱସ ൌ ሼሼTE,OR2ሽǡ ሼOR1ሽǡ ሼOR3ሽሽ 125.7572 11.5884 10.7967 11.3351 
Ȱହ ൌ ሼሼTE,OR2ሽǡ ሼOR1,OR3ሽሽ 125.0102 11.6381 11.0724 11.3847 
Ȱ଺ ൌ ሼሼTE,OR3ሽǡ ሼOR1ሽǡ ሼOR2ሽሽ 125.8066 11.5962 11.1864 10.8995 
Ȱ଻ ൌ ሼሼTE,OR3ሽǡ ሼOR1,OR2ሽሽ 125.1411 11.5058 11.0959 11.1833 
Φ଼ ൌ ሼ{OR1,OR2},{TE},{OR3}ሽ 125.2908 11.5721 11.2074 11.3333 
Φଽ ൌ ሼ{OR1,OR3},{TE},{OR2}ሽ 125.1300 11.5767 11.1922 11.2667 
Φଵ଴ ൌ ሼ{OR2,OR3},{TE},{OR1}ሽ 125.2707 11.5635 11.2002 11.2543 
Φଵଵ ൌ ሼ{TE,OR1,OR2},{OR3}ሽ 125.0268 10.8417 11.0151 11.1728 
઴૚૛* ൌ ሼ{TE,OR1,OR3},{OR2}ሽ 124.8559* 10.6262* 11.1823* 10.9029* 
Φଵଷ ൌ ሼ{TE,OR2,OR3},{OR1}ሽ 125.5609 11.5516 10.9544 11.0579 
Φଵସ ൌ ሼ{OR1,OR2,OR3},{TE}ሽ 124.2889 11.6234 11.2469 11.3056 
Φଵହ ൌ ሼ{TE,OR1,OR2,OR3}ሽ 124.6839 10.7464 11.0749 10.9627 
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Fig. 5. Delay for three overlays when TE plays SNE strategy 
 
Fig. 6. Cost comparison of NE, SNE, Coalition 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This paper focuses on the scenario where multiple co-
existing overlays are deployed above a physical network. We 
consider two situations of the hybrid interaction, and model them 
as an n+1-player non-cooperative game and a 1-leader-n-
follower Stackelberg-Nash game, respectively. However, the 
results for overlays and TE at NE and SNE are inefficient. In 
order to improve the performance of NE and SNE, we propose a 
cooperative coalition game based on Shapley value. We observe 
that the performance of all overlays and TE is significantly 
improved by the stabilized coalition game. However, the delay 
and congestion cost is inherent non-transferable, the Shapley 
value needs external coordination, therefore, the approach to 
reduce negotiation costs and to specify equivalent weight ߙ is 
worthy of future study. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This work was jointly supported by: (1) the National Basic 
Research Program of China (No. 2013CB329102); (2) National 
Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61471063, 61421061, 
61372120㸪 61271019, 61101119, 61121001); (3) the Key 
(Keygrant) Project of Chinese Ministry of Education. (No. 
MCM20130310); (4) Beijing Municipal Natural Science 
Foundation (No. 4152039); (5) Beijing Higher Education Young 
Elite Teacher Project (No. YETP0473); (6) Spanish Research 
Council (No: TIN2013-46883); (7) Regional Government of 
Madrid (No: S2013/ICE-2894) cofunded by FSE & FEDER. 
REFERENCES 
[1] D. Andersen, H. Balakrishnan, F. Kaashoek, R. Morris, “Resilient 
overlay networks,” in Proc. of the 18th ACM Symposium on 
Operating Systems Principles (SOSP), pp.131-145, Oct. 21-24, 
2001. 
[2] Y. Liu, H. Zhang, W. Gong, and D. Towsley, “On the interaction 
between overlay routing and underlay routing,” in Proc. of the 
24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and 
Communications Societies (INFOCOM), pp. 2543-2553, Mar. 
13-17, 2005. 
[3] C. Wang, N. Wang, M. Howarth, G. Pavlou, “On the interactions 
between non-cooperative P2P overlay and traffic engineering 
behaviors,” in Proc. of the 53th IEEE Global Telecommunications 
Conference (GLOBECOM), pp. 1-6, Dec. 6-10, 2010. 
[4] J. Gong, J. Liao, J. Wang, Q. Qi, L. Zhang, “Reducing the 
oscillations between overlay routing and traffic engineering by 
repeated game theory,” in Proc. of the 19th Asia-Pacific 
Conference on Communications(APCC), pp.591-596, 2013. 
[5] W. Jiang, R. Zhang, J. Rexford, M. Chiang, “Cooperative content 
distribution and traffic engineering in an ISP network,” ACM 
SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, vol.37, no.1, 
pp.239-250, 2009. 
[6] J. Xiao, R. Boutaba, “Reconciling the overlay and underlay tussle,” 
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), vol.22, no.5, 
pp.1489-1502, 2014. 
[7] W. Jiang, D. M. Chiu, and J. C. S. Lui, “On the interaction of 
multiple overlay routing,” Performance Evaluation, pp. 229-246, 
Oct. 2005. 
[8] R. Keralapura, C. N. Chuah, N. Taft, G. Iannaccone, “Race 
conditions in coexisting overlay networks,” IEEE/ACM 
Transactions on Networking (TON), vol.16, no.1, pp.1-14, 2008. 
[9] Z. Cui, J. Liao, J. Wang, Q. Qi, J. Wang, “Cooperative overlay 
routing in a multiple overlay environment,” in Proc. of the IEEE 
International Conference on Communications (ICC), pp.3100-
3105, 2014. 
[10] J. Wang, J. Liao, T. Li, J. Wang, “On the collaborations of 
multiple selfish overlays using multi-path resources,” Peer-to-
Peer Networking and Applications, vol.8, no.2, pp.203-215, 2014. 
[11] P. Yang, L. Xu, “An ISP-friendly inter-overlay coordination 
framework for multiple coexisting P2P systems,” Peer-to-Peer 
Networking and Applications, vol.7, no.4, pp.396-409, 2014. 
[12] M. Osborne, A. Rubinstein, A course in game theory. MIT press, 
1994. 
[13] T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos, “How bad is selfish routing?,” 
Journal of the ACM, vol.49, no.2, pp.236-259, 2002. 
[14] R. Cohen, D. Raz, “Cost-effective resource allocation of overlay 
routing relay nodes,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 
(TON), vol.22, no.2, pp.636-646, 2014. 
[15] R. T. B. Ma, D. M. Chiu, J. C. S. Lui, V. Misra, D. Rubenstein, 
“Internet economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement,” 
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), vol.18, no.3, 
pp.775-787, 2010. 
[16] D. Niyato, P. Wang, E. Hossain, W. Saad, Z. Han, “Game 
theoretic modeling of cooperation among service providers in 
mobile cloud computing environments,” in Proc. of the IEEE 
Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), 
pp.3128-3133, Apr.1-4, 2012. 
[17] V. Misra, S. Ioannidis, A. Chaintreau, L. Massouli, “Incentivizing 
peer-assisted services: a fluid Shapley value approach,” in Proc. 
of the ACM SIGMETRICS International Conference on 
Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, pp.215-226, 
June14-18, 2010. 
[18] J. B. Rosen, “Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for 
concave n-person games,” Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, vol.33, no.3, pp.520-534, 1965. 
[19] B. Liu, “Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium for multilevel 
programming with multiple followers using genetic algorithms,” 
Computers & Mathematics with Applications, vol.36, no.7, 
pp.79-89, 1998. 
[20] L. Vicente, P. Calamai, “Bilevel and multilevel programming: a 
bibliography review,” Journal of Global Optimization, vol.5, no.3, 
pp.291-306, 1994. 
 
0 5 10 15 20
11
11.5
12
12.5
13
13.5
14
Iteration
D
el
ay
 
 
Overlay 1
Overlay 2
Overlay 3
NE SNE Coa
124
124.5
125
125.5
126
126.5
127
Situation
C
o
n
g
e
st
io
n
 C
o
st
 o
f 
T
E
NE SNE Coa
10
10.5
11
11.5
12
Situation
D
e
la
y 
o
f O
ve
rl
a
y 
1
NE SNE Coa
11
11.05
11.1
11.15
11.2
11.25
11.3
Situation
D
e
la
y 
o
f O
ve
rl
a
y 
2
NE SNE Coa
10.5
11
11.5
Situation
D
e
la
y 
o
f O
ve
rl
a
y 
3 372
